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Majoritarianism	reinterpreted:	why	Parliament	is	more
influential	than	often	thought
Despite	Westminster	often	being	seen	as	lacking	the	teeth	to	affect	government	policy,	Felicity
Matthews	writes	that	this	is	not	the	case.	She	argues	that	reforms	to	shift	the	balance	between
government	and	parliament	have	served	to	offset	the	declining	vote	basis	of	government,	and	have
ensured	that	Westminster	remains	responsive	to	a	majority	of	the	electorate	through	the	legislative
process.
In	the	Hansard	Society’s	latest	Audit	of	Political	Engagement,	a	record	73%	of	respondents	agree
that	Westminster’s	Parliament	is	‘essential	to	democracy’.	Yet	within	the	very	same	survey,	only	32%	are	satisfied
with	the	way	Parliament	works	and	only	28%	believe	that	it	encourages	public	involvement	in	politics.	A	number	of
academic	commentators	have	also	cast	doubt	upon	Parliament’s	credentials,	with	some	regarding	it	as	‘either
peripheral	or	totally	irrelevant’;	and	within	comparative	scholarship,	the	House	of	Commons	is	frequently	derided	as
lacking	the	clout	of	its	continental	counterparts.
Yet,	this	is	one	side	of	the	story,	and	a	number	studies	have	challenged	the	image	of	parliamentarians	as	mere	lobby
fodder	within	an	executive-dominated	chamber.	Within	the	Commons,	the	increased	rate	of	parliamentary	rebellions
has	been	cited	as	evidence	of	the	loosening	bonds	of	party	discipline;	and	within	the	Lords,	the	way	in	which	votes
have	become	increasingly	closely	fought	has	been	seen	as	evidence	of	‘a	revival	of	bicameralism’.	Other	studies
have	challenged	the	portrayal	of	select	committees	as	toothless	entities	by	drawing	attention	to	their	direct	impact
and	indirect	influence	upon	government	and	its	legislation.	Similarly,	bill	committees	have	been	shown	to	provide	a
range	of	opportunities	for	members	to	debate	with	ministers	and	influence	policy.
It	is	therefore	clear	that	Parliament	matters:	on	the	floor	of	the	House	and	along	the	corridors	of	committee	rooms,
parliamentarians	have	at	their	disposal	a	range	of	means	through	which	they	can	affect	the	outcomes	of	the
legislative	process.	Yet	by	focusing	solely	on	the	dispersal	of	office	payoffs,	and	the	disproportional	benefits	enjoyed
by	an	election’s	plurality	winners,	much	existing	scholarship	has	overlooked	the	alternative	means	through	which
non-government	parliamentarians	can	achieve	policy	payoffs.
My	recent	article	in	Parliamentary	Affairs	responds	to	this	lacuna,	to	correct	the	way	in	which	Westminster’s
Parliament	has	been	misunderstood	within	comparative	political	science.	To	do	so,	I	draw	upon	the	path-breaking
work	of	G.	Bingham	Powell,	who	sought	to	systematically	identify	the	institutional	opportunities	for	opposition
influence	via	an	‘index	of	effective	representation’.	Underpinning	this	index	is	a	distinction	between	‘proportional’	and
‘effective’	representation,	which	dovetails	with	the	distinction	between	office	payoffs	and	policy	payoffs	detailed
above.
Yet,	according	to	Powell’s	analysis,	the	UK	remains	an	exemplar	of	executive	dominance.	This	is	because	by
associating	committee	strength	with	‘the	ability	of	a	committee	to	modify	legislation,	perhaps	even	introduce
legislation	of	its	own’,	Powell’s	analysis	does	not	account	for	the	many	different	ways	in	which	committees	can	exert
influence	upon	the	actions	of	government.	Indeed,	in	his	analysis,	the	UK	is	criticised	for	its	‘weak,	rubberstamp
committees’.
To	address	this,	my	article	adopts	a	broader	understanding	of	legislative	capacity	and	develops	a	series	of
alternative	measures.	This	includes	a	new	scoring	scheme	to	capture	the	institutional	dynamics	of	a	committee
system,	focusing	on	features	such	as	correspondence	with	the	functions	of	the	executive,	the	proportional
distribution	of	chairs	and	members,	independent	selection	procedures,	and	commonly	agreed	core	functions.
Together,	these	modifications	enable	a	more	nuanced	analysis	of	the	quality	of	Westminster	democracy	that	not	only
moves	beyond	binary	distinctions	between	‘government’	and	‘opposition’,	but	also	acknowledges	the	importance	of
executive	oversight	as	a	form	of	opposition	influence.
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Applied	to	Westminster,	this	refined	index	demonstrates	that	reforms	to	‘shift	the	balance’	between	government	and
parliament	have	significantly	expanded	the	opportunities	for	opposition	influence	within	the	legislature.	In	particular,
the	strengthening	of	the	institutional	basis	of	select	committees	has	been	critical	in	providing	partial	redress	to	the
concentration	of	office	payoffs.	Yet,	whilst	tempering	the	assumption	that	the	allocation	of	electoral	spoils	is	zero-sum
and	exclusionary,	these	findings	show	that	both	office	and	policy	payoffs	are	still	disproportionately	dispersed.
My	analysis	therefore	moderates	the	(implicitly	negative)	portrayal	of	Westminster	as	an	exemplar	of	majoritarianism.
Comparative	scholarship	has	cast	Westminster’s	Parliament	as	feeble,	lacking	the	teeth	to	affect	the	activities	of	the
executive.	However,	the	primacy	given	to	the	function	of	legislative	scrutiny	has	resulted	in	an	inherent
misunderstanding	of	Parliament’s	role	as	a	chamber	of	executive	oversight,	which	in	turn	neglects	the	ways	in	which
the	structures	of	Westminster	have	been	configured	to	realise	this	function.	My	analysis	also	challenges	the
assumption	that	the	election	is	the	‘decisive	stage’	in	majority	formation,	as	it	is	clear	that	these	structures	provide
the	conditions	for	ongoing	negotiation	and	trade-off	between	the	two	branches	of	government:	features	typically
associated	with	the	‘consensus’	version	of	democracy.	Finally,	and	in	the	context	of	the	democratic	dissatisfaction
detailed	above,	my	analysis	underlines	the	potential	of	electoral	reform	and	institutional	reform	to	enhance	both	the
proportionality	and	quality	of	democratic	representation.
______
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	work	published	in	Parliamentary	Affairs.
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